Dear all,
Having gone from regular contributor to avid lurker, it pains me to see
the enormous explosion in number of posts and level of confusion, especially
on the topics of SOM and the intellectual level.
I think most of us agree about the nature of SO thought, and what
constitutes "objective" as distinct to "subjective" information. I think we
also mostly understand the value of objectivity - objective information can
be shared (communicated) between different observers, while essentially
keeping its meaning. This cannot be said of subjective information. Much of
human progress is based on this distinction.
However, people miss the point that the distinction between objectivity and
and subjectivity is largely derived from empiricism. I think it was Platt
who mentioned the centrality of objectivity in science. I would add to this
that the realization of this principal is not philosophical, but pragmatic;
in practice, the yardstick for scientific objectivity is REPRODUCIBILITY -
something I wrote in my first essay "Zen and the Art of Science" posted to
the forum back in 1999. Reproducibility is considered the VERIfication that
the observation is "true" [intentional tautology].
Science has been tremendously successful at breaking down certain types of
observations into bits of information that can be easility verified, but has
left some patterns almost untouched. If SO is considered a tool, this is a
deficiency. However, when it becomes part of an ontology, the implications
are devastating. If unverified patterns are untrue (almost by definition),
and when truth is considered the absolute standard of reality, then
hard-to-verify patterns like morals and tastes become regarded as somehow
unreal. I think this pretty much describes the SO-Metaphysics that Pirsig
warns us of . . .
The SO construct as a metaphysics allows science, but denies CONscience.
While the MoQ (as outlined in ZAMM and Lila) clearly shows the utility and
limits of SO thought, it does not offer a clear alternative (the
multiplicity of contradictory posts is evidence of this). Bodvar wants us to
consider SO thought as the entirety of Pirsig's "Intellectual" level. IMO,
this approach undermines the MoQ by denying the role of hard-to-verify
patterns like feelings and emotions in the intellectual process. On the
other hand, many of us (myself included) consider intellect to include every
type of pattern. The molecules, atoms, protons, neutrons, electrons and
quarks are all intellectual constructs, inorganic patterns that depict
(communicate) a certain facet of reality. Cells and organisms are also
intellectual constructs - biological patterns that depict reality at a
different level. Same goes for social patterns.
The recurring problem we have is how to regard recursive patterns of
intellect depicting itself. I think that Pirsig caused this problem by
making an intellectual LEVEL a part of his MoQ. In this, he inherited the
same problem that exists in Mind vs. Matter metaphysics, i.e. how mind
thinks about itself.
In Lila, Pirsig gave a list of "intellectual patterns" that I consider
highly problematic. What is intellectual about democracy - is the aggregated
decision of millions of electors with average intelligence and education no
more than . . . errr . . average, really better than the decision of an
elite of the smartest and wisest? As a democrat, I think that it is, but not
because democracy is an intellectual pattern, but because democracy is a
highly evolved, highly resilient SOCIAL pattern. The same goes for freedom
of the press, freedom of speech, trial by jury.
Actually, Pirsig doesn't exactly say that these are intellectual patterns.
He says that they are "moral codes that established the supremacy of the
intellectual order over the social order" (Lila, Ch. 13). This doesn't tell
us anything about what the intellectual level actually is.
My own solution to this conundrum is to conclude that there is no need for a
separate intellectual level. Intellect is the whole of the MoQ, and patterns
of value are all intellectual patterns, subdivided into inorganic,
biological and social patterns. Those 3 subdivisions are enough. Before
anyone challenges met with the example of mathematics, let me give my
pre-emptive answer: Mathematics is a social pattern; it is a language for
communicating experiences and perceptions.
Finally, it is my observation that when we "intellectually" analyse our own
thoughts in this forum, we inevitably look at the inorganic patterns
(molecular interactions and electric pulses in neurons), the biological
level (senses, instincts etc.) or the social level (language,
communication). Again, 3 levels are enough - you don't even need an
intellectual level to talk about intellect.
My 3-level approach should be no surprise to Lila Squad/MD veterans. It's in
the archive from long ago, but somewhat after the material that made it into
Dan Glover's book. Dan, if you ever get around to siring Lila's Second
Child, I'd love to see Pirsig's counterargument.
Thanks to everyone who read this. Now I will go back to lurking . . .
Jonathan
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