From: skutvik@online.no
Date: Thu Jul 31 2003 - 08:43:47 BST
Hello All Philosophers.
I have at several occasions expressed my wonder about Pirsig from
"Lila's Child" who - from annotations presented - I don't really
recognize. I had till now not read the annotations in any systematical
way, but did so the other day and have maybe found the answer in #
102 which says:
* " I see more clearly today than when I wrote the SODV (Subjects,
Objects, Data and Value") that the key to integrating the MOQ
with science is through philosophic idealism which says that
objects grow out of ideas, not the other way round. Since at the
most primary level the observed and the observer are both
intellectual assumptions, the paradoxes of quantum theory have
to be conflicts of intellectual assumptions, not just conflicts of what
is observed. Except in the case of Dynamic Quality, what is
observed always involves an interaction with ideas that have been
previously assumed.....etc".
Ah! The "philosophical idealism" that I have spotted in several
annotations is a mere STRATEGY to get the MOQ integrated with
science (Quantum Physics). But why not say so to the MOQ readers?
WARNING now I am acting the role as a SOM idealist!. For instance
the annotation that Rick presented to me. (I haven't found the
number)
* And in this highest quality intellectual pattern, external
* objects (matter) appear historically before intellectual
* patterns... But this highest quality intellectual pattern itself
* comes before the external world, not after, as is commonly
presumed by
* the materialist.".
But is such a strategy possible, or wise? Analyzing the above.
Pirsig says that SOM says that matter comes before mind, but this is
only the objective half of SOM, the subjective idealist half says the
opposite. With this erroneous opening it becomes a bit weird :
SOM is the highest intellectual pattern, but the MOQ is supposed to
be still "higher" (are there room at the top?). Still, the problem is that
the MOQ can't well adapt one half of SOM (the idealist) without
becoming a subset of SOM.
This effort to make the MOQ an idealist philosophy is wasted because
(as he says lower down in # 102) the quantum findings are only weird
from a SOM p.o.v, but it has succeeded in the creating a lot of
confusion at this forum. But then, is it really a strategy? In annotation
after annotation Pirsig takes the idealist position - for instance in # 3 -
"Without humans to make assuptions, that assumption cannot be
made ..etc.
I don't know if this idealism follows from having defined the intellectual
level as thinking or it's the other way round: intellect must be mind to
"make assumptions", but any way it nullifies the insight that P. arrived
at in ZMM, namely that QUALITY is the creator of the Subject/Object
pair and thereby the materialist/idealist divide. It (idealism) also
creates problems for the MOQ as presented in LILA where intellect is
supposed to be a static level - out of the static social level - and in
conflict with the parent level. But where is the static element in
"thinking"? One may principally think of everything! And the conflict
with social value? Totally absent.
But there is this little sentence in the opening annotation that saves it
all
"Except in the case of Dynamic Quality, what is observed always
involves an interaction with ideas that have been previously assumed"
DQ is excepted from the closed observer-observed circle, a reality
outside it.This is the most significant statement of the whole LC: Once
the Copernican Revolution was made the world became a QUALITY
existence and the static evolution began with the inorganic.The static
levels aren't quasi-intellectual patterns, rather the necessary base for
intellect.
Sincerely
Bo
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